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BOOK REVIEW

Equality and Preferential Treatment. Edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas
Nagel & Thomas Scanlon. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press. 1977. Pp. xiv, 209. $8.50 (hardcover ed.), $3.95 (paperback ed.).
Americans do not know what they mean by equality. Black people suffer
inequality, up to an unidentified point within the zone of definitional imprecision. Other more or less identifiable classes of people suffer more or less
from something they believe to be inequality, but no consensus exists as to the
fact and degree of their suffering. Reformers would like to help the disadvantaged. Scarcity of resources and the legitimate claims of the relatively privileged combine to limit the help that can be given. Nobody seems to be able to
fashion an effective program to reconcile the competing claims without
offending more principles than it honors. Nobody wants to give up, either.
The foregoing themes emerge from an examination of Equality and Preferential Treatment,' a collection of essays in ethical and legal philosophy, drawn
(with one exception) from the Princeton University Press quarterly Philosophy
& Public Affairs, 2 and addressed to the end and means that give the book its
name. As a collection, this "reader," as it is designated on cover and title
page, must be judged according to two primary criteria: the quality of the
individual selections and the efficacy of the whole at identifying and treating
issues. Resolution of issues cannot be required of an aggregation of essays
which for the most part were neither explicitly written nor arranged to
produce adversary clash. 3 By these standards, Equality and Preferential
Treatment displays considerable unevenness. The individual essays range
along a quality spectrum from adequate to outstanding, but the conceptually
sterile arrangement of the essays--philosophers at beginning and end, lawyers
in between 4-squanders the impact of the best pieces and forces the lawyerreader (and who else reads law review book reviews?) to plow through sixty
pages of an unfamiliar writing style that resembles verbal origami before
reaching "solid ground," that is, articles with citations. Nevertheless, the
reader receives a clear sense of both the gravity and complexity of the issues
raised and treated and the desperate effort most of the writers exert to find an
ethical and constitutional mediating principle that also will lessen real-world
inequality. Thus, as a whole, the collection provides questions, modes of
1. Equality and Preferential Treatment (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Preferential Treatment].

2. The exception is Dworkin, DeFunis v. Sweatt, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb. 5, 1976, at
29-33, reprinted in Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 63 [hereinafter cited as Dworkin).
3. But see text accompanying notes 11-15 infra.
4. In this review the essays will be treated in the order in which they appear in the collection.
All page references not otherwise specifically identified refer to pages in Preferential Treatment,
supra note 1.
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thought about them, and a sense of urgency for answer, and any book
accomplishing that much must be deemed at least a qualified success.
Professor Thomas Nagel of the Princeton philosophy department, one of
the volume's editors, provides, in his brief Introduction, a crisply written
taxonomy of the issues treated by the essayists. He notes, and I believe
correctly, that the point at which social amelioration programs lose much of
their appeal to the majority is the point where the clear connection between
the common purpose of society and the individual purposes of its members
comes unstuck-in his words, where "[a program] subordinates the individ'
ual's right to equal treatment to broader social aims. "S
This discontinuity
forces into the open the lack of precise associativity between group equality
and individual equality. Once this problem is identified, a host of other
considerations becomes relevant: what is a "group," which groups are disadvantaged, how should atypical individuals-affluent blacks, for example-be
handled? Finally, Nagel introduces the sometimes complementary, sometimes
competing principle of merit, emphasizing that this concept, too, means
different things for groups than for individuals and with reference to present
moral deserts than to past advantages or deprivations. 6 Professor Nagel
continues his analysis of the equality/merit interface in the first of the
"theoretical" essays, 7 and the first few pages demonstrate his ability to add
detail to the analytical framework foreshadowed in the Introduction. Thereafter, however, Nagel's contribution to the volume's impact is reduced by his
unwillingness or inability to limit himself to clearly relevant issues. The real
"injustice" in America, the reader is told, is "neither racial nor sexual but
intellectual"; true equality is impossible in a society that places a premium on
successful performance of intellectually demanding tasks and rewards it
lavishly. 9 In the presence of this overriding injustice, all lesser maladjustments lose part of their significance. Thus, the likelihood of injustice to
specific individuals resulting from preferential treatment of groups is less
important, since, absent thoroughgoing reform, individual universities or
businesses cannot do much to help anyway. 10 Nagel's digression into sociological grand theory displays characteristics common to ideological writing--distortion of main themes to highlight the "lesson" and insistence on
its own relevance to any and all subjects. In the context of this volume, such
loss of focus is annoying and unnecessary.
The only explicit debate in the book follows Nagel's essay, in the form of a
summary of possible justifications for preferential hiring by Judith Jarvis

5. Nagel, Introduction to Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at viii [hereinafter cited as
Introduction].
6. See id. at xii-xiv.
7. Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 348
(1973), reprinted in Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Nagel].
8. See Introduction, supra note 5, at xiv.
9. Nagel, supra note 7, at 12.
10. See id. at 12-13, 17-18.
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Thomson of MT" and a sharp reply by Robert Simon of Hamilton College. 12 Their disagreement manifests itself over definitions and the relationship of means to ends. Thomson suggests that the most plausible justification
for preferential hiring is compensation of disadvantaged groups by reallocating opportunities that otherwise might have gone to members of the dominant
segment of the population or of less disadvantaged groups. In her view, the
might-have-been-chosen applicant for the opportunity is not wronged, because the community determined that it was necessary to make amends for
the injuries done to victimized groups. 13 Simon challenges her definition of
groups as overinclusive, questions the notion that compensating individual
members of a disadvantaged group compensates the group, and cautions that
any lowering of overall social efficiency invaijably hurts worst the already
disadvantaged. 14 On the face of it, Simon appears to construct a slightly
better argument, but he enjoys two key advantages: the opportunity to
respond critically to a proposal formulated by another and the opportunity for
the last word. 15 Accordingly, it is difficult to adjudge a winner. It is also
unnecessary, because the Thomson-Simon exchange deals with such a carefully circumscribed topic area-preferential hiring decisions between several
at least minimally qualified candidates for university teaching positions-that
were it not that the questions raised defy both writers' attempts rigidly to
confine them, it might be entirely irrelevant. As they appear in Equality and
Preferential Treatment, however, the Thomson and Simon essays project
welcome controversy from their narrow context into the collection as a whole.
Part I closes with the best of the philosophers' essays, an alternative
justification for "reverse discrimination" by George Sher of the University of
Vermont.16 Again, perhaps "best" is an unfair accolade, since Sher wrote
after and cited to Nagel as well as to Thomson and Simon. 17 However, his
writing displays none of the niggling scholasticism that occasionally surfaces
in the Thomson-Simon exchange, and it exhibits a willingness to treat broad
themes and to reformulate and develop, not just debunk. On these grounds,
then, it sufficiently outperforms its predecessors to warrant singling out for
special praise. Sher contributes significantly by suggesting that the past
discrimination/present amelioration discontinuity can be transcended by approaching the problem as one of present inability to compete for social
rewards on equal terms with other members of society.' 8 This characteriza11. Thomson, Preferential Hiring, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 364 (1973), reprinted in Preferential
Treatment, supra note 1, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Thomson].
12. Simon, PreferentialHiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, 3 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 312,
reprinted in Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 40 [hereinafter cited as Simon].
13. See Thomson, supra note 11, at 37-38.
14. See Simon, supra note 12, at 41-43, 47.
15. Both of these advantages could have been offset by providing Thomson the opportunity
to write a brief rebuttal to Simon. The volume does not indicate whether this was done.
16. Sher, Justifying Reverse Discriminationin Employment, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 159 (1975),
reprinted in Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 49.
17. See id. at 53 n.6, 52 n.5, 51 n.4, 50 n.3.
18. See id. at 53.
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tion not only alleviates the seeming unfairness of assessing present "charges"
for past wrongs by identifying the question in terms of what is needed to
improve ability to compete; it also provides built-in benchmarks for limiting
the extent or term of the programs ultimately adopted.' 9 Like his cocontributors, Sher exhibits reluctance to extrapolate from the example of
blacks qua disadvantaged group to any other; unlike them, he suggests a
reason for his reluctance. Other arguably disadvantaged groups--particularly
women-show fewer signs of disability to compete in the formal sense; rather,
they show a disinclination to do so, albeit for cultural reasons, and Sher
convincingly employs the conceptual model developed in discussing the
disadvantages of being black to show why compensation for disinclination to
compete is both difficult and dysfunctional. 20 This translation of principles
from one context to another affords at least some hope of future synthesis.
The first of the "legal/empirical" essays in Part II, by Ronald Dworkin of
Oxford, originally appeared in the New York Review of Books. 21 In an
intellectual yet occasionally colloquial style, the piece attempts to identify the
reasons why "traditional" equal protection cases seem so easily defensible,
while cases like DeFunis22 (and, by implication, Bakke2 3) raise passions and
defy easy resolution. His answer is simple: it "lies in [the] belief that . ..
DeFunis and Sweatt24 must stand or fall together,12 s and this belief, says
Dworkin, is fallacious. In an elaborate discourse drawing heavily on utilitarian theory, he argues that the distinction between the two paradigmatic cases
is that the exclusion of Sweatt from law school on racial grounds violated the
principle of "treatment as an equal" because it was founded on an untrustworthy "external preference, '2 6 that is, race prejudice, whereas DeFunis' exclusion did not violate the principle because it was based on both ideal arguments and on an external preference that operated against the apparent
interest of the dominant group. 27 Some of Dworkin's assumptions seem open
to question. For instance, the assertion that one "cannot make an ideal
argument for segregation" 28 depends more upon contemporary views of
defensible "ideals" than on the technical inability to construct such an argument. However, his basic approach convincingly analyzes the normative
impact of preferential policies and offers a theoretical basis for adjudging
19. See id.at 56-58.
20. See id.at 57-59.
21.

See note 2, supra.

22. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), vacating as moot 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169 (1973) (en banc).
23. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
24.

Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

25. See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 70 (footnote added).
26. An external preference is an individual's preference concerning the assignment of goods or
opportunities to others, in contradistinction to a personal preference, which concerns their
assignment to him. See id. at 77.
27. See id.at 77-82.
28. Id. at 74.
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benign racial classifications necessary for their implementation. In effect,
Dworkin refines and gives shape to ideas that infused Thomson's essay in less
choate form; where Thomson asserted that the community had the right to
accord preference to achieve intergroup fairness, Dworkin tells why, and
convincingly.
Two essays by Professor Owen M. Fiss of the Yale Law School follow
Dworkin's piece. The first 29 is a sweeping and brilliant redefinition of the
equal protection clause; 30 the second is an analysis of the philosophical and
practical questions posed by school desegregation in the seventies, particularly
de facto segregation. 3' Both essays display meticulous research, deep thought
and intellectual fairness; standing alone, they provide adequate reason to read
the book. In Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, Fiss contends that the
effect of the Equal Protection Clause has been improperly limited to an
"antidiscrimination principle" forbidding the use of racial criteria in establishing classifications of people. Drawing upon recent cases, he demonstrates that
the supposed crispness and impartiality of the antidiscrimination principle has
been compromised by attempts to
reshape it to cover the problems posed by
"nondiscriminatory state action" 32 and by action with differential impact, yet
based on "facially innocent criteria. '33 Then he recasts the clause as a
guarantee of countermajoritarian protection to "specially disadvantaged
groups" '34 and submits normative, historical, and practical arguments in
support of his revision. Under this approach, preferential treatment is acceptable because it is not group-disadvantaging; it operates "against" all of
society, but in its service at the same time, in a manner consistent with the
expectations of the framers of the equal protection clause. 35 Groups completes
the development that began with Thomson's tentative notion that something
could be done for the disadvantaged without scourging this society's values.
Its only drawback is a function of its strengths: it is so carefully constructed
that it requires slow and painstaking reading.
School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law adopts an approach
reminiscent of Sher's. Recent developments such as de facto segregation and
white flight to the suburbs have loaded the traditional trigger for remedial
action-past discrimination-with much confusing and unnecessary doctrinal
hardware, says Fiss, and it all misses the real issue: "Is a segregated pattern of
student attendance harmful, and if so, how harmful?1 36 Reducing the debate
to questions of present impact eliminates the inconsistency of requiring
29. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976), reprinted in
Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 84 [hereinafter cited as Fiss I].
30. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, c1. I.
31. Fiss, School Desegregation:The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1974),
reprinted in Preferential Treatment, supra note 1, at 155 [hereinafter cited as Fiss IIl.
32. See Fiss I, supra note 29, at 113-18.
33.
34.

See id. at 118-23.
See id. at 132.

35.

See id. at 124-45.

36.

See Fiss I,

supra note 31, at 191.
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maximum efforts from "guilty" districts while confining the remedy to them,
thus fueling the very problems that threaten the future of public educational
systems. 37 School Desegregation is rather a more technical essay than Groups,
and its ideas seem less original. Still, it is more readable than its predecessor,
so if it carries a lighter payload, it is more likely to deliver the goods to a
casual reader.
Inexplicably, the volume ends with an essay on affirmative action hiring
programs by Alan Goldman of the University of Miami. 3 8 Goldman's essay
returns to the themes treated in the early pieces: merit, victimization, compensation, and balancing of interests. He sharply criticizes the pursuit of
affirmative action through the establishment of numerical goals, contending
that this practice creates a new zone of exclusion that offends the "rights" of
white male applicants who have met society's standards of competence. Yet
its isolation from the so-called "theoretical" essays with which it so clearly
shares thematic affinity, presumably because it contains some empirical data
and even a few anecdotes, gives Goldman's work an appearance of redundancy. This impression is aggravated by his own bifurcation of evidence and
theory; the first seven pages of the article discuss the real-world wranglings
between HEW and private institutions, while the last ten are filled with
qualifying expressions rather than specific references to the data. 39
In retrospect, therefore, the book appears as a somewhat haphazard
assembly of the works of a clearly talented group of thinkers. In addition to
the uninspired order of presentation, 40 evidence of a sloppy edit includes
references in Simon's essay to portions of Thomson's, not to page numbers in
this volume but to those in the original magazine article, and apparent failure
to revise or update footnoted material, resulting in inconsistencies in citation. 41 Thankfully, the quality of the writing-especially that of Sher, Dworkin, and Fiss--prevents the dissipation of the contributors' ideas. Those
responsible for the collection of periodical essays into individual subjectmatter volumes should not abandon their attempts, for collections like this
one provide a convenient source of commentary on important issues. In
particular, Equality and Preferential Treatnent affords a great deal of material to the reader who seeks constructive ways of thinking about the Bakke
See id. at 183, 187, 190.
38. Goldman, Affirmative Action, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 178 (1976), reprinted in Preferential
Treatment, supra note 1, at 192.
39. Compare id. at 199-209 with id. at 192-98.
40. Unwilling to be a "destructive critic" without suggestions for improvement, I submit
that a far more felicitous presentation could have been effected by: (a) pairing the contributions of
Nagel and Dworkin and presenting them immediately after the Introduction; (b) grouping the
Thomson, Simon, Sher, Goldman, and Fiss School Desegregation pieces under the informal
subheading "Contexts"; and (c) closing with Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, which is
suited by its length, depth, and theme to serve as capstone.
41. E.g., compare Fiss I, supra note 29, at 121 n.61 ("AMilliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)"),
with Dworkin, supra note 2, at 63 n.2 ("DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974)"). DeFunis
was decided before Milliken and appears in volume 416 of the United States Reports.
37.

598
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decision and its likely implications. Nonetheless, it must be hoped that future
volumes will exhibit greater attention to editorial detail, in order that their
contents may be read and understood with the full appreciation they deserve.

John E. Nelson, III*
*

B.A. 1970, Williams; J.D. 1975, University of Texas. Member of the Texas bar.

